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# Fostering Competition in Consolidated Markets

Paul B. Ginsburg, Ph.D., Testimony to California Senate Committee on Health, March 16, 2016

#### **Increasingly Consolidated Markets (1)**

- Consolidation in many health care markets already extensive
- Trend accelerating
  - Providers: Increasingly challenging environment to be a small hospital or medical practice
    - Pressure on payment rates
    - New contracting models
    - Electronic medical records
    - Lifestyle choices by younger physicians





#### **Increasingly Consolidated Markets (2)**

- Insurers: Challenging environment for small insurers
  - Multi-state employers prefer national accounts
  - Scale economies in building analytic capabilities
  - Scale needed to contract with providers with alternative payment models
- Implications: Consolidation will increase even with vigorous anti-trust enforcement
  - Need public and private initiatives beyond antitrust to foster competition on price and quality





#### **Fostering Competition**

#### Insurance market

- Public and private exchanges
  - Reduce entry barriers
  - Support consumer comparison of plans
  - Need to improve risk adjustment
- Focus most of statement on provider competition

#### Provider market

- Broadening anti-trust policy
- Policies to foster market forces
- Direct regulation of prices





#### **Broadening Anti-trust Policy**

#### Hospital ownership of medical practices

- Higher prices to purchasers
  - Research literature to support this is developing
- Barrier to steering patients to high-value providers
- Reduces potential competitors in reformed payment contracting market

#### Cross-market mergers

- "Must have" hospital achieves higher rates for system hospitals in other markets
  - Agencies have looked at markets separately





#### **Price and Quality Transparency**

- Transparency a societal value
  - But often oversold as strategy to foster competition
  - Some benefit designs have few incentives to choose lower-priced providers
    - High deductibles have little incentive for inpatients
  - Complexity makes this a heavy lift for many consumers
    - Some excellent price tools from insurers/employers getting little use
  - Quality transparency an aspiration for future





#### **Network Strategies (1)**

- Concept: insurer as purchasing agent
- Shifting volume from high-priced to lowpriced providers
  - Three potential sources of savings
    - Higher proportion of care at lower-priced providers
    - Discounts from providers seeking inclusion
    - Stronger incentives for providers to reduce costs





#### **Network Strategies (2)**

- Potential for using broader measures of price and incorporate quality
  - Analytic parallels to alternative payment models
    - Cost per patient per year or per episode
- Opportunity for integration of payment and delivery
  - Provider-sponsored plans or joint ventures with insurers





#### Narrow vs. Tiered Networks (1)

- Narrow networks a more powerful tool
  - Stronger patient incentives for steering
  - Attraction of larger premium reduction
    - Around 15 percent in ACA Marketplace plans
  - Exchanges provide ideal environment
    - Fixed contributions mean strong incentives to seek lower premiums—and accept less choice
    - Absence of "one-size-fits-all" constraint
    - Exchange tools facilitate consumer comparisons of networks across plans





#### Narrow vs. Tiered Networks (2)

- Tiered networks have potentially larger consumer acceptance
  - Point of service choices
    - Popularity of PPOs and tiered formularies
- But dominant providers have blocked many tiered networks
  - 2010 legislation in Massachusetts opened door to tiered plans in state





#### Narrow vs. Tiered Networks (3)

- Reference pricing: an "extra strength" tiered network approach
  - Stronger incentives for patients to use providers under the reference price
  - A relatively simple choice for patients
  - CalPERS success with joint replacement and other services
    - But how much spending is suited for this approach?
      - $\circ\,$  Concept of "shoppable" services





#### **Challenges for Network Approaches**

- Need for better transparency about networks
- Getting network adequacy requirements right
  - Balance between cost saving, risk selection prevention and consumer protection
  - Importance of speedy appeals on specialist needs
- "Surprise balance bills" an issue for broad networks as well



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#### **Other Steps to Foster Competition**

- Steps to foster independent medical practices
  - Public and private payers
- Additional restrictions on anticompetitive behavior
  - All or nothing requirements
  - Most favored nation clauses





#### **Regulatory Alternatives**

- Some states contemplating rate setting
  - Some success in the past
- Challenges for using approach in 2016
  - Large differences between commercial, Medicare and Medicaid rates likely to be grandfathered
    - Or regulate only commercial rates (WV)
  - Rate setting needs to encourage payment reform rather than block it
    - Promising attempt in Maryland
    - Can it work if rate setting applies only to hospital rates?





#### **Possible Legislative Priorities**

- Restrictions on anti-competitive practices
  - Preferred tier placement demands
  - Most favored nation clauses
  - All or none contracting requirements
- Regulate network adequacy wisely
  - A potent tool to foster competition—even in consolidated markets
  - Address the problems while preserving much of the potency





### **Concluding Thought**

- Payment reform likely to contribute to consolidation
  - Proceed with payment reform
  - Enforce anti-trust policy and pursue additional policies that foster competition
  - Consider rate setting a "stick in the closet" to use if market approaches fail





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